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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
FENCES. The creditor was an adjoining land owner of
the Chapter 12 debtor. The debtor had reached an agreement
with the creditor to build a fence between their properties,
but although the creditor built the creditor’s portion, the
debtor did not build any fence. The creditor filed three
claims in the bankruptcy case for damages to the creditor’s
crop caused by the debtor’s cattle which moved on to the
creditor’s land.  The debtor argued that Ill. Rev. Stat. , ch
54, ¶ 9.01, the Fence Act, placed the liability for the
damages on the creditor because the creditor did not
maintain the constructed fence. The court held that the
Fence Act did not apply because the debtor did not construct
the debtor’s portion of the agreed to fence; therefore, the
debtor was liable for negligently allowing the cattle to run at
large. In re Anderson & Sons Partnership, 165 B.R. 243
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for the equity remaining after a mortgage. The
debtors sought to avoid a pre-petition judgment lien against
the homestead as impairing their exemption. The
Bankruptcy Court held that because the judgment lien
exceeded the debtors’ exemption amount, the lien was
completely avoided. The District Court reversed, holding
that the lien could be avoided only to the extent the lien
impaired the exemption. In re Osborne, 165 B.R. 183
(W.D. Va. 1993), rev’g, 156 B.R. 188 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1993).
The debtors had claimed a rural homestead as exempt in
a Chapter 7 case. Prior to the bankruptcy filing, a creditor
obtained a judgment lien against the debtors’ property. The
debtors were denied a discharge under Section 727 and filed
for avoidance of the judgment lien as impairing their
homestead exemption. The court held that the denial of
discharge did not affect the avoidance rights of the debtors
for liens which impaired exemptions. The court also held
that the judgment lien was not avoidable for impairing the
homestead exemption because, under Texas law, judgment
liens do not attach to property previously declared to be the
debtor’s homestead; therefore, the lien could not impair the
homestead exemption. The appellate court reversed, holding
that although the judicial lien was unenforceable against the
homestead, the lien was avoidable as impairing the
exemption through the cloud on the debtor’s title created by
the eventual liability of the debtor for the lien from the
proceeds of the sale of the homestead. In re Henderson, 18
F.3d 1305 (5th Cir. 1994), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. rev’g,
155 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992).
JURISDICTION. The debtor had executed a pre-
petition land sale contract to purchase timber land from the
plaintiff. Eight days later, the debtor filed for Chapter 7.
During the bankruptcy case, the debtor removed and sold
timber from the property. The debtor then abandoned the
property back to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed for recovery
of the value of the cut timber. The court held that it had no
jurisdiction over the claim because the claim would not
affect the bankruptcy estate. The court held that jurisdiction
could not be predicated upon the possible effect on the
debtor alone. In re Mayhone, 165 B.R. 264 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtors failed to file a federal
income tax return for 1988 but filed a statement of intent to
file a joint return after filing for an extension of time to file
but did not file a return. The IRS prepared a substitute return
for 1988. The court held that the statement of intent to file a
joint return did not convert the substitute return into a filed
return; therefore, the 1988 taxes were nondischargeable
because no return was filed. In re Eastwood, 164 B.R. 989
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1994).
The debtor failed to file and pay taxes owed for 1974-
1981.  Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the debtor pled
guilty, under I.R.C. § 7203, to willfully failing to file an
income tax return for 1976 in exchange for dropping other
charges.  The debtor also filed returns for the missing years
but only paid the taxes due for one year. The IRS argued
that the taxes still owed for the 1974-1981 taxable years
were nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(C) for
willful attempt to evade taxes. The Bankruptcy Court held
that the debtor's guilty plea was an admission only of the
element of willfulness of the failure to file and pay taxes but
did not prove that the debtor made any act or commission to
evade taxes; therefore, the taxes were dischargeable. The
appellate court held that the Bankruptcy Court applied the
wrong standard in using the criminal definition of “willfully
attempted to evade” and should have used the lesser civil
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standard in the bankruptcy case.  The appellate court held
that the taxes were not dischargeable because the debtor
voluntarily and intentionally failed to file and pay the taxes.
Matter of Toti, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,235 (6th
Cir. 1994), aff’g, 149 B.R. 829 (E.D. Mich. 1993), rev’g
on point, 141 B.R. 126 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992).
The IRS had prepared substitute income tax returns for
the debtor’s 1981, 1982 and 1983 tax years and issued a
Notice of Deficiency based on those returns. The debtor
challenged the notice in the Tax Court. During the Tax
Court case, the debtor supplied filled-in Form 1040’s for the
tax years. The Tax Court case was ultimately settled more
than two years before the debtor filed for Chapter 7 and the
debtor sought discharge of the taxes for 1981, 1982, and
1983. The court held that the submission of income tax
returns in the Tax Court case was  a sufficient filing for
purposes of the discharge of the taxes. In re Elmore, 165
B.R. 35 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1994).
LOSSES. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
allowing the transfer of a debtor's passive activity losses and
other disallowed losses to a Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy
estate. The regulations also provide for the passing back to
the debtor of the passive activity losses and disallowed other
losses after the termination of the bankruptcy case or upon
transfer of estate property to the debtor other than by sale or
exchange. The regulations are effective for cases
commencing after November 9, 1992, and for cases
commenced before that date if the estate and debtor both
elect to have the regulations apply. The regulations do not
affect the rules for net operating losses. 59 Fed. Reg. 24935
(May 13, 1994), adding Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1398-1, 1.1398-2.
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF CONTRACT. The plaintiff was a beef
processing plant which leased its premises from the
defendant which operated a cattle stockyard on the same
land. The lease provided that the tenant was to pay an
annual rent plus a fee for each head of cattle purchased from
third parties and brought through the stockyard to the plant.
The lease also contained a provision that if the defendant
ceased operating the stockyard, the plaintiff had the right of
first refusal to purchase the stockyard. The plaintiff claimed
that the defendant breached the lease because the stockyard
did not furnish at least 50 percent of the cattle needed by the
plant. The court held that the lease was unambiguous in not
containing any provision guaranteeing a supply of cattle
from the stockyard.  In addition, even if such a provision
was found in the lease, the provision failed for want of
consideration because the plaintiff had no duty to purchase
50 percent of the cattle through the stockyard.  As the court
noted, sales of cattle in the stockyard were made through
open bidding, making any guarantee that the plaintiff would
make any purchase very difficult. The court also held that
the defendant did not cease operating the stockyard when
the defendant sold a portion of the yard to a third party,
because the stockyard did not cease operating as a stockyard
after the sale. B&H Investment Co. v. Union Stockyards
Co., 513 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
debtor had obtained a farm ownership loan from the
plaintiff. After several years of default and a restructuring of
the loan in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the debtor’s attorney
informed the plaintiff that the debtor would not make a
scheduled plan payment and would seek further
restructuring in the bankruptcy case. The plaintiff sent the
debtor notice of loan restructuring rights but the debtor
made no application for debt restructuring. The debtor
sought to prevent a foreclosure by claiming that the notice
of debt restructuring rights was premature in that the debt
was not distressed when the notice was sent. The court held
that the debtor’s history of defaults and bankruptcy and the
notice that the debtor was going to default again were
sufficient to make the loan distressed. The court noted that
the debtor did not make any application for debt
restructuring. The debtor also argued that the sale of the
farm in one piece violated Idaho Code § 11-304. The court
held that the debtor failed to provide any evidence that the
farm land was not operated as one unit. Farm Credit Bank
of Spokane v. Stevenson, 869 P.2d 1365 (Idaho 1994).
The plaintiff obtained a farm ownership loan from the
FmHA and granted a second mortgage on the farm to the
FmHA. The first mortgage owner foreclosed on the farm
and the FmHA redeemed its interest in the farm from the
first mortgage holder. The FmHA evicted the plaintiff and
the plaintiff, pro se, sued the FmHA for wrongful eviction.
The court granted summary judgment to the FmHA because
the plaintiff did not plead that all administrative remedies
had been exhausted. The court noted that the FmHA cannot
itself be sued and that the United States was the proper
defendant. Pugh v. FmHA, 846 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Fla.
1994).
FARM LOANS. The FmHA has adopted as final
regulations reducing the amount of collateral needed for
farm loans from the FmHA. 59 Fed. Reg. 25797 (May 18,
1994).
FARMER OWNED RESERVE . The CCC has adopted
as final regulation determining that the 1993 crops of wheat
and feed grains may not be pledged for farmer owned
reserve loans. 59 Fed. Reg. 25795 (May 18, 1994).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The plaintiff had sold produce to a
division of a corporation and had not received payment. The
plaintiff filed a notice of intent to preserve PACA trust
rights but filed the notice in the name of the division instead
of the corporation. The corporation had acquired the
division in a merger three years before the filing of the
PACA trust notice and the plaintiff was shown to have
known about the merger. A creditor of the corporation filed
an objection to the plaintiff’s PACA trust claim in the
corporation’s bankruptcy case, arguing that the notice was
ineffective because it did not name the corporation as holder
of the trust funds. The plaintiff argued that it filed the notice
in the name of the division because only the division was
licensed under PACA. The court held that the PACA trust
fund notice was insufficient because the regulations require
the notice to include the name of the seller-supplier and not
the license holder. In re Chipwich, Inc. 165 B.R. 135
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiffs claimed
injury from pesticides manufactured by the defendants and
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sprayed in the plaintiffs’ home. The plaintiffs’ claims
included failure to warn, mislabeling, negligent design and
breach of warranty. The court held that the failure to warn
and mislabeling claims were preempted by FIFRA, but the
breach of warranty and negligence claims were not
preempted. Wright v. Dow Chemical U.S.A., 845 F. Supp.
503 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
RICE. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
providing for a five percent acreage reduction for 1993 rice
and no acreage reduction for 1994 rice. The regulations also
set the price support for 1993 and 1994 rice at $6.50 per
hundredweight. 59 Fed. Reg. 25794 (May 18, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
AWARD OF LITIGATION COSTS . After conducting
an “in-house” review of the estate’s valuation of timberland
at $355,713, the IRS assessed a deficiency based on a value
of $836,000. In preparation for trial, the IRS had an
independent appraisal which reduced the IRS claim to
$662,704. The trial court, however, ruled in favor of the
estate valuation and the estate sought recovery of litigation
costs under I.R.C. § 7430, arguing that the IRS valuation
was substantially unjustified. The court held that the
litigation costs could not be recovered because the IRS
valuation was not substantially unjustified but only subject
to the variances of opinion inherent in the appraisal process.
Taylor v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,165 (M.D.
Ala. 1994).
DISCLAIMERS. Under the decedent’s will, shares of
stock passed to the decedent’s child. The will also provided
that if the child predeceased the decedent, the stock was to
pass to the child’s spouse and children. The decedent’s child
disclaimed a portion of the stock bequest and distributed the
stock, as executor, to the grandchildren. The decedent’s
state law had no provision that a disclaimer of a
testamentary interest passed as if the disclaimant
predeceased the decedent. The IRS ruled that under
Mississippi common law, disclaimed interests passed in
intestacy; therefore, the disclaimed stock still passed to the
child by intestacy.  Because the child’s intestacy interest
was not disclaimed, the transfer of the stock to the
grandchildren was a gift taxable to the child. Note, as the
ruling pointed out, most states have enacted provisions that
would have prevented this result. Ltr. Rul. 9417002, June
23, 1993.
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* The decedent’s estate
contained an interest in a corporation established by the
decedent in 1957. The decedent had contributed all of the
property to the corporation and the estate claimed that the
decedent had transferred by gift a one-third interest in the
corporation to each of the decedent’s two sons. No gift tax
return was filed, no tax was paid and no shares of stock
were issued. The corporation’s income tax returns for
several, but not all, taxable years listed the three parties as
owning 33.33 percent of the stock. The court held that the
estate did not sufficiently prove the decedent did not own all
of the stock because (1) no gift tax return was filed, (2) the
income tax returns were inconsistent, and (3) the income tax
returns were not probative as to stock ownership. Est. of
Dubois v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-210.
The decedent’s predeceased parent had owned an
interest in a profit sharing trust. The trust provided for the
parent’s interest to pass in equal shares to three children “or
their issue per stirpes.” At the parent’s death, the trustee
determined to distribute the decedent’s share in 10 annual
installments, only one of which was received by the
decedent before death. The decedent’s estate argued that the
decedent’s gross estate did not include the undistributed
funds in the trust. The court held that the trust instrument
was unambiguous in devising complete one-third interests to
each child; therefore, the entire one-third interest in the trust
was included in the decedent’s gross estate. Stack v. U.S.,
94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,167 (8th Cir. 1994), aff’g,
93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,136 (D. Minn. 1993).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed property in trust to the surviving
spouse for life. The trust provided for quarterly payments of
trust income and discretionary principal payments to the
surviving spouse. The surviving spouse had a testamentary
power to appoint trust property to the decedent’s issue. The
independent trustee made loans to the decedent’s three sons
at an interest rate sufficient under I.R.C. § 7872; however,
the interest was not to be paid but only accrued. The trustee
made distibutions equal to the accrued interest f rom
principal to the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse’s
will provided for distribution of the loan notes to the
makers. The notes and accrued interest would be included in
the surviving spouse’s estate. The IRS ruled that the loans
were not a disposition under I.R.C. § 2519 sufficient to
disqualify the loaned trust property for the marital
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9418013, Feb. 2, 1994.
The taxpayer established a trust for the taxpayer’s
spouse which was to be funded at the taxpayer’s death with
any funds in an IRA. The trust provided that the trustee was
to demand distributions from the IRA to at least equal the
income from the IRA or to distribute trust principal to equal
the IRA income. The surviving spouse had the power to
demand that the IRA be invested in income producing
assets. The IRS ruled that the interest in the IRA passing in
trust to the surviving spouse would be QTIP. Ltr. Rul.
9418026, Feb. 7, 1994.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  In 1973, the
taxpayers transferred a ranch to a new corporation in
exchange for stock. The taxpayers’ son also transferred
stock in another corporation in exchange for stock in the
new corporation. The taxpayers did not file a gift tax return
for the transfer because the taxpayers’ accountant believed
the value of any gift to the son was less than the annual
exclusion amount. However, the taxpayers’ new accountant
in 1975 filed a late gift tax return for 1973. In 1991, the IRS
mailed a deficiency notice claiming that the transfer was a
taxable gift. The court ruled that the late filing of the gift tax
return began the running of the statute of limitation on
assessment of gift tax which had expired by 1991. Est. of
Simpson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-207
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].  The
IRS has issued the 1994 list of average annual effective
interest rates charged on new loans by the Farm Credit Bank
system to be used in computing the value of real property
for special use valuation purposes:
   District    Interest rate  
Baltimore 9.34
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Columbia 9.70
Louisville 9.34
Omaha 9.15
Sacramento 10.46
St. Paul 9.64
Spokane 9.60
Springfield 9.51
Texas 9.79
Wichita 9.22
Rev. Rul. 94-33, I.R.B. 1994-21, 5.
VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* The decedent’s estate
included a ranch which the decedent’s will bequeathed to a
state university subject to the right of the ranch managers to
lease the land for grazing during the lifetimes of the
managers. The will also contained a provision revoking the
bequest to the university if the bequest did not result in a
significant deduction for the estate. The court ruled that the
value of the ranch for estate tax purposes was the full fair
market value of the ranch on the decedent’s date of death
because the bequests did not affect the decedent’s interest in
the property. The court also ruled that the value of the ranch
passing to the university was the fair market value of the
property less the value of the option to lease held by the
managers. The court held that the will provision revoking
the university bequest was not activated because a majority
of the bequest was eligible for the deduction. The court also
held that the interest passing to the university was not a
charitable remainder trust because the university received
full title to the property. Est. of Proctor v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-208.
The taxpayers had transferred a ranch to a new
corporation in exchange for shares in the corporation. The
taxpayers’ son had transferred stock in another corporation
to the new corporation in exchange for stock. The issue was
the value of the ranch. The court valued the ranch at its fair
market value less a discount for the remoteness of the ranch
location and the large size of the ranch which would limit
the number of potential buyers. Est. of Simpson v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-207.
In July 1985, the taxpayer and two sons executed a buy-
sell agreement for the valuation and purchase of the
taxpayer’s stock upon the death of the taxpayer. The
agreement also governed any buyout of the shares owned by
the two sons. In 1992, the three shareholders amended the
Articles of Incorporation to change the allocation of
corporate powers upon the death of the taxpayer to insure
that the two sons would share the management of the
corporation. The shareholders also changed the buy-sell
agreement for purchase of the taxpayer’s stock at death at
fair market value and for sale of stock between the two sons
to provide for equal buyout rights. The IRS ruled that the
original agreement was not subject to I.R.C. § 2703 because
it was entered into before the effective date of Section 2703
and that the amendments did not subject the stock to Section
2703 valuation rules because the amendments did not
change the shareholders’ rights in the stock. Ltr. Rul.
9417007, Jan. 3, 1994.
Four members of a family contributed shares of stock to
a new partnership. The parent contributed the most shares
and received in exchange preferred partnership units. The
preferred units had voting rights, preference in distribution
of partnership income of at least 6.5 percent annual return
with interest paid on any arrears, and preference in receiving
partnership assets upon termination to the extent of the
value of stock contributed to the partnership. The IRS ruled
that the parent’s interest in the partnership was an applicable
retained interest because the partnership interest was an
equity interest with an extraordinary payment right and a
distribution right. Therefore, the I.R.C. § 2701 valuation
rules would apply and the subtraction method had to be used
to value any transfer by gift of partnership interests from the
parent to the other family members. Ltr. Rul. 9417024,
Jan. 27, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSE. An attorney was not allowed
deductions for expenses related to a horse farm where the
expenses were not supported by records or were personal in
nature. Rice v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-204.
The taxpayer was not allowed deductions and
investment tax credit resulting from an investment in a cattle
leasing investment scheme because the investment scheme
lacked economic substance. The investment company
purchased cattle at 10 times their cost, sold interests in the
cattle to the taxpayer for promissory notes and a small
amount of cash and leased the cattle back to the sellers for
an amount similar to the payments due on the notes.
Although the taxpayer had some farm background, the
taxpayer did not take an active part in the cattle purchase
and leasing operations. The court held that the investment
was only a tax-avoidance scheme and denied deductions
resulting from the investment. Dauost v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-203.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.* A tax-exempt
agricultural cooperative had two classes of members. The
first class consisted of agricultural commodity producers
and was allowed a vote on all cooperative matters. The
second class, associate members, consisted of persons
interested in agriculture and did not have a right to vote.
Both classes paid the same amount of dues. The associate
members, however, could hold office and could purchase
insurance at members’ rates from a subsidiary of the
cooperative. A survey indicated that most of the associate
members became members in order to obtain the insurance.
The IRS ruled that the income from the sale of insurance to
the associate members was taxable as unrelated business
income under I.R.C. § 511. Ltr. Rul. 9416002, Dec. 20,
1993.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer had filed a suit against a former employer for sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a common law tort, and breach of
contract. The jury awarded the taxpayer $70,000 in
compensatory damages and $70,000 in punitive damages on
the claim for sex discrimination and sexual harassment,
$70,000 in compensatory and $30,000 in punitive damages
on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional stress,
and $10,000 for the breach of contract. The plaintiff also
received costs and attorney’s fees. The court held that the
$100,000 in punitive damages was included in the
taxpayer’s gross income because the awards were intended
as punishment and not as compensation for injury to the
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taxpayer. Reese v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,232 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aff’g, 28 Fed. Cl. 702 (1993).
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer was
denied an expense deduction for a computer used in the
taxpayer’s business where the taxpayer failed to make a
proper election to take the election under I.R.C. § 179. The
taxpayer was allowed to take ordinary depreciation for the
computer. Rice v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-204.
   DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was
a partner in a partnership which had a portion of a mortgage
debt cancelled. The court held that the partner did not have
discharge of indebtedness income for the partner's share of
the cancelled debt because the partner was insolvent before
and after the cancellation of partnership indebtedness.
Instead, the partner's basis in the partnership interest was
reduced by the partner's share of the cancelled debt. Babin
v. Comm'r, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,224 (6th Cir.
1994), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-673.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.02[13].* In 1983, the IRS
issued proposed regulations, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-
2(b)(2), providing that a taxpayer is deemed to have a
principal place of business for each trade or business in
which the taxpayer engages. The IRS has withdrawn that
proposed regulation because the U.S. Supreme Court in
Soliman v. Comm’r, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993) stated that some
businesses may not have a principal place of business. The
proposed regulations, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3),
also stated three factors for determining the location of the
principal place of business. The IRS has withdrawn that
regulation because the three factors differ from the two
factors given in Soliman. 59 Fed. Reg. 26466 (May 20,
1994).
INTEREST. The court held that the taxpayers could not
deduct, as residential interest, interest payments on loans
used to purchase a vacant lot. Garrison v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-200.
The taxpayers purchased a principal residence using the
proceeds of a loan secured by commercial property which
was 50 percent owned by the taxpayers and 50 percent
owned by third parties. No part of the residence was used to
secure the loan. The IRS acknowledged that the loan
proceeds and interest were to be allocated to the residence
but ruled that because the debt was not secured by the
residence, under Notice 88-74, 1988-2 C.B. 385, the interest
was not deductible as qualified residence interest under
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3). Ltr. Rul. 9418001, Nov. 5, 1993.
LOSSES. The taxpayers were denied a Section 1244
small business stock loss deduction where the taxpayers
failed to comply with the recordkeeping requirements of
Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(e)-1(b). Wong v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-202.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY. The IRS has ruled
that a limited liability company (LLC) formed under the
Kansas Limited Liability Company Act, Kan. Stat. §§ 17-
7601 et seq., may be taxed as a corporation or a partnership
because the Act allows the LLC agreement to provide for
centralized management and continuation of the company
without consent of the members after the transfer of a
member’s interest. Thus, if the LLC agreement does not
provide for these occurrences, the LLC may be taxed as a
partnership. Rev. Rul. 94-30, I.R.B. 1994-19, 6.
The taxpayers converted a limited partnership into a
limited liability company (LLC). The IRS ruled that the
LLC would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the LLC
lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity of life since
the state LLC law and the LLC agreement required the
consent of all members to continue the partnership after a
terminating event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate
characteristic of transferability of interests because the Act
and agreement provided that if any other member objected
to the sale or assignment of a member’s interest in the LLC,
the transferee or assignee had no right to participate in the
management of the LLC. The IRS also ruled that (1) no gain
was recognized from the conversion of the limited
partnership to the LLC, (2) the basis and holding period of
an interest in the LLC was the same as the basis of the
former partnership interest, and (3) the basis of LLC
property was the same as for the partnership property. Ltr.
Rul. 9417009, Jan. 17, 1994; Ltr. Rul. 9416028, Jan. 18,
1994; Ltr. Rul. 9416029, Jan. 18, 1994.
The taxpayers formed a limited liability company (LLC)
under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. Under
Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233, the IRS had ruled that a
Delaware LLC could be taxed either as a corporation or
partnership, depending on the LLC agreement. The IRS
ruled that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership because
(1) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life since the state LLC law required the consent of all
members to continue the partnership after a terminating
event and the LLC agreement required the approval of at
least two-thirds of the members to continue the partnership,
and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
transferability of interests because the Act provided that if
any other member objected to the sale or assignment of a
member’s interest in the LLC, the transferee or assignee had
no right to participate in the management of the LLC and
the partnership agreement required the permission of the
executive committee for any assignment or sale of an
interest. Ltr. Rul. 9416026, Jan. 18, 1994.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
June 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.56 5.48 5.44 5.42
110% AFR 6.12 6.03 5.99 5.96
120% AFR 6.69 6.58 6.53 6.49
Mid-term
AFR 6.92 6.80 6.74 6.71
110% AFR 7.62 7.48 7.41 7.37
120% AFR 8.33 8.16 8.08 8.02
Long-term
AFR 7.52 7.38 7.31 7.27
110% AFR 8.28 8.12 8.04 7.99
120% AFR 9.06 8.86 8.76 8.70
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued revised
procedures for issuance of letters for determination of
whether a plan satisfies the current availability
requirements. The new procedures decrease the amount of
information required for such letters. Rev. Proc. 94-37,
I.R.B. 1994-21.
For plans beginning in April 1994, the weighted average
is 7.30 percent with the permissible range of 6.57 to 8.03
percent for purposes of determining the full funding
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limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 94-53, I.R.B.
1994-20, 12.
NEGLIGENCE
EMPLOYER LIABILITY. The plaintiff was a member
of a family which owned a farm corporation, although the
plaintiff did not own any stock. The plaintiff was not paid
for services performed for the corporation and had other
employment. The plaintiff was injured while moving a grain
bin for the corporation. The court upheld a jury verdict
against the corporation, holding that the jury had sufficient
evidence that the corporation did not supply adequate help
and tools or a safe place to work. The court also held that
the plaintiff’s negligence was slight in relation to the
corporation’s negligence and that the plaintiff did not
assume any known risk which caused the injury. Nelson v.
Nelson Cattle Co., 513 N.W.2d 900 (S.D. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Dilts v. U.S., 845 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Wyo. 1994) (meals
and lodging expense) see p. 78 supra.
Minter v. U.S., 19 F.3d 426 (8th Cir. 1994) (special use
valuation) see p. 73 supra.
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